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WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT-
AT-WILL RULE IN CALIFORNIA: DEHORNEY v. BANK
OF AMERICA
Historically, the employment-at-will doctrine has insulated employers from
liability in wrongful discharge actions.' Until recently, an at-will employee
could be discharged for good cause, bad cause, or no cause. 2 Recognizing
the often severe consequences of the employment-at-will rule, an increasing
number of jurisdictions are providing at-will employees some protection
from arbitrary discharge.3 Indicative of the sweeping demise of an employer's
absolute right to terminate an at-will employee is the fact that few states
continue to strictly apply the employment-at-will rule. 4
1. See, e.g., Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951) (a contract for
permanent employment is terminable at the will of either party, unless it is based upon
consideration other than the services to be rendered); Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp., 271
Cal. App. 2d 147, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680 (2d Dist. 1969) (employment agreements calling simply
for performance of services are terminable by either party without additional consideration);
Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1st. Dist. 1964) (contract for
permanent employment is a contract for an indefinite period and is terminable by either party,
regardless of ill will).
2. See, e.g., Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (4th Dist. 1960)
(employer can terminate an at-will employee at any time for any reason); Roberts v. Western
Pac. R.R., 142 Cal. App. 2d 317, 298 P.2d 120 (1st Dist. 1956) (an indefinite employment is
terminable at will by the employer, with or without cause); see also S. WILLISTON & W. JAEGER,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960)
(both treatises support the proposition that an indefinite hiring is terminable by either party at
any time unless it is supported by independent consideration).
3. See L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DIsMissAL §§ 10.01-10.52 (1986) (state-by-state
analysis of major statutory and judicial exceptions to the employment-at-will rule). See also
Strasser, Employment-A t- Will: The Death of a Doctrine, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at I (noting
that forty states currently recognize exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine).
4. Only the following states have not recognized exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Utah, and
Vermont. See, e.g., Heidleck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982) (court
refused to enforce provision of employee handbook received by employee after starting work);
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. App. 1985) (court refused to recognize
a cause of action where employee terminated for refusing to construct water and sewage
treatment facilities without proper government approval); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242
Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978) (motives of employer in dismissing at-will employee are legally
immaterial); Janda v. Iowa Indus. Hydraulics, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1982) (public policy
exception does not protect an at-will employee from being fired at any time); Gil v. Metal
Service Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. App.) (Louisiana's traditional and unique deference to
legislative authority precluded creation of purely judicial exception to employment-at-will rule),
writ denied, 445 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1982); Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985)
(employer's absolute right to fire an at-will employee when employment contract explicitly
termed employee's status as at-will upheld); Dudzik v. Leesona Corp., 473 A.2d 762 (R.I. 1984)
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California is at the forefront of the judicial movement to harness the
employer's absolute right to discharge at-will employees. Since 1980, Cali-
fornia has adopted three distinct theories of recovery that limit the potentially
egregious consequences that result from mechanically applying the employ-
ment-at-will rule: 1) a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy;' 2) a contract cause of action for wrongful discharge in
breach of an implied covenant to terminate only for good cause; 6 3) a cause
of action. grounded in both contract and tort for an employer's wrongful
discharge in breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.7
California and a small minority of other jurisdictions recognize the most
liberal exception to the employment-at-will rule and impose a duty of good
faith and fair dealing on the employer-employee relationship.' This exception
holds that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every
contract requires that neither party injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement. 9 The recent decision in DeHorney v. Bank of
Americal° effectively abolishes the at-will presumption in California by
(employment contract of indefinite duration is terminable at will); Bihlmaeir v. Carson, 603
P.2d 790 (Utah 1979) (absent an express or implied stipulation as to duration of employment,
employment is terminable at will); Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt. 114, 435 A.2d 952
(1981) (termination of employee during thirty day trial period does not violate public policy).
5. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980); Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1959). See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1st
Dist. 1981). See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(2d Dist. 1980). See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
8. The following states recognize a good faith and fair dealing limitation to the employment-
at-will doctrine: Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Montana, and North Dakota. See, e.g.,
Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing
prevented employer from firing employee solely to prevent him from receiving contracted share
of profits); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (2d
Dist. 1980) (longevity of employee's service together with expressed employment policies of
employer precluded discharge without good cause under covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1971) (covenant of
good faith and fair dealing violated where employee fired solely to prevent him from receiving
commission on multimillion dollar sale); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d
1015 (Mont. 1984) (existence of objective manifestations by employer give rise to employee's
belief of job security and fair treatment); Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 333
N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984) (dicta recognized existence of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts).
9. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
10. 777 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1985). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, published in the advance sheet at this citation, was withdrawn from bound volume
publication at the request of the court, which ordered that the petition for rehearing be stayed
pending decision of the Supreme Court of California in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174
Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), review granted, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, 712 P.2d 891
(1986). The full text of the DeHorney opinion can be found at 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 723
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expanding the application of a good faith and fair dealing standard to
virtually every employment situation. Prior to DeHorney, the good faith and
fair dealing protection was available only where employees could establish a
long term of service and a violation of express employment policies." The
DeHorney court held the good faith and fair dealing exception to be inde-
pendent of any requirement of longevity of service and simply stated that
the duty of fair dealing requires an employer to treat like cases alike.' 2
This Note will trace the development of the employment-at-will doctrine
and the legislative and judicial limitations that have evolved to confront its
application. The Note will then discuss the serious shortcomings of DeHorney
and the impact its broad employee protection will have upon employers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Doctrine
The origin of the employment-at-will rule can be traced to an 1877 treatise,
Master and Servant," written by Horace G. Wood. The theory, commonly
referred to as Wood's Rule, stated that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at Will, without presumption of any term. 4 However, courts
and commentators calling for the demise of the at-will doctrine argue that
none of the four cases cited in support of Wood's Rule actually support it."
(BNA 1985).
The Foley decision is significant because it is the first employment-at-will decision to be
heard by the California Supreme Court in a number of years. The Foley court held that the
employee's alleged wrongful termination, for reporting that a superior had been released from
a former job for suspected embezzlement, did not constitute a wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy. 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870. The court found no statutory basis for Foley's alleged
duty to police his fellow employees. Id. The court next held that the statute of frauds precluded
Foley from prevailing on his implied contractuAl claim. Id. Finally, the court determined that
Foley's seven years of service fell short of the necessary longevity required to assert a successful
good faith and fair dealing claim. Id. at 871. Moreover, the court noted that Foley failed to
adequately allege the existence of express formal procedures for terminating employees. Id.
Because all three theories of recovery were asserted in Foley, the California Supreme Court is
presented with the opportunity to alleviate the confusion surrounding wrongful termination law
in California.
11. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
12. 777 F.2d at 448.
13. Wood's treatise states:
With us the rule is inflexible, that general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon
him to establish it by proof .... [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is terminable at
the will of either party ....
H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 273 (1877).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 375, 710 P.2d
1025, 1030 (1985) (noting that none of four cited cases supported Wood's rule and that rule
ran directly counter to another treatise); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
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Although the legal foundation of the at-will rule may be questionable, it
is clearly a product of the laissez-faire economic policies of the late nineteenth
century.' 6 The at-will rule comported with the accepted notions of freedom
of contract prevalent at the turn of the century. 7 At that time, mutuality
of obligation was considered necessary for a binding contract. 8 Without
some additional and independent consideration, an employee's work entitled
him to a wage and nothing more.' 9 Because an employer had an undisputed
320 n.3, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 n.3 (lst Dist. 1981) (noting Wood's rule finds dubious support);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 602 nn.13-14, 292 N.W.2d
880, 886, 886-87 nn.13-14 (1980) (lengthy discussion of cited cases and conclusion that cases
held that jury should infer contract duration from circumstances surrounding its formation);
Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 697, 699-706 (1981) (noting Wood incorrectly interpreted four cited
American cases); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-
47 (1974) (discussing Wood's rule and its lack of justification) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied
Contract Rights]. But see W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 27 (1985) (suggesting that Wood's rule was supported by cases cited earlier in his
treatise).
16. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 921 (1st Dist. 1981) (industrial revolution in nineteenth century emphasized freedom of
contract in employment relationships). See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 15, at 9-12
(prosperity thought to depend on elimination of all barriers to process of free exchange);
Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor
Law, 71 CALn. L. REV. 942, 943-44 (1983) (acceptance of Wood's rule rooted in laissez faire
economic principles present at turn of the century) [hereinafter cited as Comment, State Actions
for Wrongful Discharge]; Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 15, at 343 (adoption of
Wood's rule can be inferred from economic and social context in which it developed).
17. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
(1st Dist. 1981) (primary emphasis placed on freedom of parties to define their own relationship);
see Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge, supra note 16, at 943-44 n. 1 (freedom
of contract rationale prevailed at the turn of the century); Comment, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAgv.
L. REV. 1816, 1825-26 (1980) (at-will rule conformed with premise of complete social freedom;
individuals required to clearly obligate themselves before law would restrict employer's freedom
to terminate) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Protecting At Will Employees].
18. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725 (2d Dist. 1980) (absolute power of Labor Code § 2922 founded on contractual concept of
mutuality of obligation); W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 15, at 52-55 (section of
treatise discussing development of modern mutuality of obligation theory that disregards
requirement of symmetry); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419 (1967) (noting that
even contracts for permanent employment were held unenforceable because they lacked mutuality
of obligation).
19. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 449, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725 (2d Dist. 1980) (noting that mutuality of obligation entitled employer to terminate employ-
ment relationship at his pleasure); W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 15, at 43-52 (section
in treatise discussing development of consideration theories and proposing abandonment of
requirement of independent consideration for promise of job security); Comment, State Actions
for Wrongful Discharge, supra note 16, at 944 (noting California courts required independent
consideration to limit employers' power of discharge); Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra
note 15, at 351-56 (discussing separate consideration as a condition to enforcing contracts of
indefinite duration).
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right to discharge an employee, the employee had a corresponding right to
quit at any time for any reason.10 Thus, the employment-at-will rule provided
employers with the discretion necessary to fuel the rapidly expanding econ-
omy of the late nineteenth century.
By the twentieth century the at-will rule was so widely accepted that it
took on a presumptive status. The United States Supreme Court protected
an employer's absolute right to discharge an employee at will when it declared
unconstitutional federal and state statutes forbidding the termination of
employees for union membership. 2'
B. Legislative Limitations
In 1872, California became the first state to legislatively codify the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. California Labor Code Section 2922 provides that:
"An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will
of either party on notice to the other.12 2 Employment for a specified term
is defined as employment for a period greater than a month.23 By its
continued existence, Section 2922 serves as a legislative sanction of the
employment-at-will doctrine.24
The Depression and its resulting social legislation provided the first inroads
into the employment-at-will doctrine.21 The enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act 26 in 1935 protected employees by prohibiting an employer from
using discharge as a means of intimidating and coercing employees who
20. See Blades, supra note 18, at 1419 (noting irony that mutuality notion of employment
relationship has been expressed as arising out of a concern for the freedom of employees);
Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Common Ground for the Torts
of Wrongful Discharge from Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1981) (at-will
rule served perceived economic needs during a period of industrial expansion).
21. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (Kansas statute outlawing discharge of
employees for union activity declared unconstitutional); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (federal statute forbidding discharge of employees because of union membership held
unconstitutional). However, the rights of employers in employment decisions did not go totally
unfettered, see Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (law forbidding more than ten-hour
day for manufacturing employees held within state's police power); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (law forbidding employment of women in laundries for more than ten hours per
day upheld); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1897) (law forbidding employment of coal miners
in mine for more than eight hours per day upheld).
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1986).
23. Id.
24. Santa Monica Hosp. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 698, 182 Cal. App. 3d 878,
218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (2d Dist. 1985), review granted, 222 Cal. Rptr. 224, 711 P.2d 520 (1986)
(existence of Labor Code § 2922 prevented court from depriving employer's historic right to
remove an employee where no length of employment is specified).
25. Lopakta, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 6 (1984) (scarcity
of jobs during Depression led to enactment of National Labor Relations Act).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1986).
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exercised their right to organize.27 However, this legislative limitation upon
an employer's previously absolute right to discharge was narrowly confined
to union activity.2"
Congress again significantly limited the employer's ability to discharge by
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 29 No longer could race,
national origin or sex serve as a justification for employee termination.
Additionally, other select groups have been protected by similar legislation. 30
However, this legislative protection does not extend to the bulk of the
workforce.3
C. Judicial Limitations
Several factors have contributed to the recent judicial willingness to create
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. The most significant factor
is the reluctance of many courts to judicially sanction egregious employer
behavior by mechanically applying the at-will rule.32 In such cases, courts
have determined that employees should not bear the expense of unwarranted
and capricious employer acts.
Another factor is the erosion of the original justifications for the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Radical changes in employment relationships have
occurred since the early 1900's.33 Today, employees are more dependent on
corporate employers and expect benefits beyond their salary.34 There is also
a great inequity in job security between union and non-union employees.35
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1986) (prohibits discharge for union activity, protected
concerted activity, or filing charges or giving testimony under the Act).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor
Relations Act constitutionally restrains employers from unjustly interfering with right of em-
ployees to organize).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a) (1981) (Title VII prohibits discharge based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin).
30. See Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge, supra note 16, at 946 nn.31-34
(exhaustive listing of statutory protection for employees); Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra
note 15, at 337 (noting various members of public and private sector that have been statutorily
protected).
31. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
(Ist Dist. 1981) (employees unable to form unions are left without protection). Approximately
twenty-two percent of American employees are unionized. Comment, Protecting At Will Em-
ployees, supra note 17, at 1816 n.2.
32. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 380, 710 P.2d
1025, 1035 (1985) (court "compelled to conclude that termination of employment for refusal
to participate in public exposure of one's buttocks is a termination contrary to the policy of
this state").
33. See Lopakta, supra note 25, at 5 (noting change in employment relationship since at-
will rule won acceptance).
34. As a result of non-union employees' inferior bargaining power, they are unable to
adequately protect themselves from arbitrary termination. Lopakta, supra note 25, at 5.
35. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 17, at 1816 (noting differences
in job security between public or union employees and employees in the private sector).
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In addition, considering the level of state and federal regulation that modern
businesses are subject to, it is clear that the laissez-faire economic principles
of the late nineteenth century have faded away.36 Finally, the theories of
contract law that govern employment relationships have significantly changed.
Modem contract law no longer requires mutuality of obligation.37 Today,
contracts must simply be supported by adequate consideration. 38 There is no
longer a requirement of perfectly matching consideration on both sides. 39
Thus, an employee's work is sufficient consideration to support an employ-
er's promise beyond the payment of wages.
In response to the often harsh consequences of the employment-at-will
rule, California courts have developed three theories of recovery to provide
at-will employees protection from arbitrary discharge: a tort cause of action
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; 4° a contract cause of
action for wrongful discharge in breach of an implied covenant to terminate
only for good cause; 41 and a cause of action grounded in both contract and
tort for wrongful discharge in breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 42
1. Public Policy
While the public policy exception is the most widely accepted limitation
to the at-will rule, it is also the narrowest. 43 The seminal California case of
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" imposed a significant
limitation on an employer's absolute right to terminate employees at will by
nullifying the right to discharge an employee who refuses to perform an
unlawful act. In Petermann, a union employee was discharged for refusing
to perjure himself before a legislative committee 5. 4 The Petermann court held
that to permit a discharge for refusing to commit a criminal act would be
"obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy." ' 46
36. See Lopakta, supra note 19, at 4 (atmosphere of intervention created by succession of
labor and civil rights statutes have contributed to advancement of judicial exceptions to
employment-at-will rule).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981): "If the requirement of consideration
is met, there is no additional requirement of ... (b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) 'mutuality of obligation."' Id.
38. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 17, at 1819 (no additional
consideration necessary to support a promise of job security).
39. Id.
40. See supra note 5.
41. See supra note 6.
42. See supra note 7.
43. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. RE. 1931, 1931 n.5 (1983).
44. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1959).
45. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28 (the terminated employee refused to follow his employer's
instructions and gave truthful testimony under oath).
46. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
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Surprisingly, the Petermann decision was not a catalyst of wrongful dis-
charge actions in California outside of the union setting. However, the long-
dormant decision was revived by an at-will employee in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.47 The Tameny court held that an employee discharged for
refusing to engage in illegal conduct at his employer's request may bring a
tort action for wrongful discharge s. 4 In Tameny, an employee with fifteen
years of service was discharged when he refused to participate in an illegal
scheme to fix retail gasoline prices.4 9 The court imposed a duty on all
employers to help implement the fundamental public policy embodied in the
penal statutes.50 The Tameny standard states that when an employer's mo-
tivation for a discharge contravenes some substantial public policy principle,
the employer is held liable to the employee for both contract and punitive
damages.5" The public policy exception can be alleged when an at-will
employee is discharged for refusing to commit a wrongful act, performing
a public obligation, or exercising a legal right or privilege.
5 2
The employee in Tameny also alleged that his discharge constituted a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in
every contract. 3 The California Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
address that issue because a tort remedy was already available to the employee
under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.5 4 Although
the court reserved judgment on the good faith and fair dealing exception, it
recognized its existence in other jurisdictions in the wrongful discharge setting
and its importance in California insurance cases." This dictum laid the
foundation for future cases seeking to extend the good faith and fair dealing
exception to California wrongful discharge actions.
The common law requirement in California that a cause of action be
supported by statutory authority in order to satisfy the "substantial public
policy" standard has restricted the reach of the Tameny decision.56 In Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, the court expressly held that "courts have
no power to declare public policy in wrongful discharge cases without
statutory support." ' "T In Shapiro, a discharged employee's public policy claim
47. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
48. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
49. Id. at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
50. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (employer's authority does not
include right to demand that employee commit a criminal act).
51. Id. at 177, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
52. See Lopatka, supra note 25, at 6-17 (discussion of cases falling within each category).




56. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal. Rptr.
613, 618 (2d Dist. 1984).
57. Id.
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was unsuccessful because he failed to allege that he was terminated for
asserting a statutory right, or refusing to commit an illegal act, or because
the employer directly violated a statute by discharging him. 8 The Shapiro
court also held that California has no public policy to promote job security
and stability in the community. 9 Further, the court considered the existence
of California Labor Code Section 2922 as compelling evidence that "ter-
mination at-will is not, standing alone, a violation of public policy." '60
Clearly, the California courts have concluded that, absent statutory authority,
employees are not entitled to permanent employment as a matter of public
policy.
2. Implied Contract
A second theory embraced by the California courts limits the employer's
right to discharge when an employee can prove the existence of an express
or implied agreement that his employment can be terminated only for good
cause. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,61 a California Court of Appeals held
that the presumption that an employment contract is intended to be termin-
able at will is subject to contrary evidence. In Pugh, an employee with thirty-
two years of service was so completely unprepared for his termination that
he expected to receive a promotion when called to be discharged by his
superior. 62 During the entire period of his employment, there had been no
formal or written criticism of his work.6 3
The Pugh court established a two-tier test to invoke the protection of an
implied promise not to terminate its employees arbitrarily. In the first tier,
the court determines whether the employee can rebut the statutory presump-
tion of at-will status by showing an implied term of the contract to the
contrary. 64 This test was satisfied in Pugh by the employer's express policies
not to treat its employees arbitrarily.65 The second tier involves several factors
that, considered in the "totality of the parties' relationship" can establish
an implied promise for continued employment.66 These factors include the
personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of
service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the
employee is engaged. 67 Following traditional contract analysis, the Pugh
58. Shapiro simply alleged that although he was performing satisfactorily, he was fired
without cause. Id.
59. Id. at 477 n.5, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.5.
60. Id.
61. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1st Dist. 1981).
62. Id. at 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
65. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
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court held that the employee's thirty-two years of service, commendations
and promotions, lack of criticism of his work, and the expressed policies of
the employer combined to establish an implied promise to terminate only
for good cause.68
It is noteworthy that when presented with facts similar to the main
California good faith and fair dealing case, Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., 6 9 the Pugh court chose to expressly reject the applicability of the good
faith and fair dealing standard.70 In fact, the employee in Pugh had been
employed nearly twice as long as the employee in Cleary.7I The Pugh court
held that the employer's acceptance of responsibility to refrain from arbitrary
conduct, as evidenced by its express policies, was better analyzed with
traditional contract theories. 72
A recent California case to shed light on the first tier of the Pugh test is
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors.71 In Shapiro, an employee signed
a stock option agreement that expressly defined his employment relationship
as employment-at-will. 74 The court held that Shapiro was unable to rebut
the presumption of his at-will status because an express contract and implied
contract on the same subject cannot be contradictory.7" Thus, evidence of
an express agreement defining an employee's status as at-will precludes the
application of the second tier of the Pugh "totality of the relationship" test.
Other jurisdictions recognizing the implied contract exception use a more
contemporary form of contractual analysis than California. Representative
of the modern approach is the New Jersey decision of Woolley v. Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Inc.7 6 The Woolley court held that promises of job security
contained in an employment manual constituted an offer.7 The context of
the manual's careful preparation and its pervasive distribution as the "official
policy" of the company supported the conclusion that the manual was the
most reliable statement of the company's terms of employment.78 The court
68. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
69. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (2d Dist. 1980).
70. The court found the Cleary result to be "equally explicable in traditional contract
terms." Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 328-29, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
71. Id. at 328, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
72. Id. at 329, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
73. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (2d Dist. 1984).
74. The Stock Option Agreement stated: "Nothing in this . . . Agreement ... shall confer
upon the Employee any right to continue in the employ ... or shall interfere with or restrict
in any way the right . . . to discharge the Employee at any time for any reason whatsoever,
with or without good cause." Id. at 473 n.l, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 616 n.1.
75. Id. at 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 622. The court held that "there cannot be a valid express
contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different
results." Id.
76. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985). It is noteworthy that the DeHorney court also relied
on Woolley. 777 F.2d at 449 n.9.
77. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 300-01, 491 A.2d at 1266.
78. Id.
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also held that the employee's continued work, while under no obligation to
do so, was sufficient consideration to constitute a valid acceptance by the
employee. 79 In applying a unilateral contract analysis, the Woolley court held
that in choosing to establish personnel policies, the employer bargained for
the continued work by their employees and the resulting loyalty and coop-
eration that arises from knowing they will be treated fairly.8 0 Thus, the court
held that implied promises of job security contained in employment policy
manuals could be contractually enforceable.8' This analysis can be applied
to either express written or oral promises of job security.
3. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Only a small- number of states recognize the broadest exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, the implied duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 2 The first California case to impose this duty is Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.83 Cleary held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract requires that neither party injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement.8 4 In Cleary, an employee with
eighteen years of satisfactory service was terminated after being falsely
accused of theft, leaving his work area without authorization, and threatening
another employee with bodily harm.85 The employer violated its established
employment policies by failing to afford the employee a fair and impartial
hearing to protest his discharge.8 6 The Cleary court held that the longevity
of an employee's service together with the expressed employment policy of
the employer operated as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge by
the employer without good cause.8 7 The court held that discharging an
employee with eighteen years of service without legal cause offends the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts. 8
The court imposed a duty upon the employer to do nothing that would
79. Id. at 302-03, 491 A.2d at 1267.
80. Id. at 302-04, 491 A.2d. at 1267-68.
81. Id. at 306, 491 A.2d at 1269. Other jurisdictions have made similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983); Leikvold v.
Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (2d Dist. 1980).
84. The concept of good faith and fair dealing was borrowed from California insurance
law. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.
2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958)).
85. All of the accusations violated the employer's regulations. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
722.
86. Id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
87. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
88. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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deprive the employee of the accrued benefit of their employment bargain. 9
Further, the existence of the employer's express policy regarding adjudicating
employee disputes compelled the conclusion that the employer recognized its
obligation to engage in good faith and fair dealing with all of its employees.9
Therefore, the Cleary holding states that longevity of service combined with
the existence of express policies that confer just treatment impose a standard
of good faith and fair dealing upon California employers.
II. THE DEHORNEY DECISION
Vicki DeHorney was employed as a teller with Bank of America for nine
months when a $20 discrepancy was discovered in her daily tally. 9' An
internal auditor was assigned to investigate the matter and interrogated
DeHorney about the discrepancy. 2 During the interrogation, DeHorney
interpreted one of the auditor's statements as a racial slur. 93 As a result of
the interrogation the auditor concluded that DeHorney had stolen the money,
even though DeHorney denied any wrongdoing. 94 The auditor filed an in-
vestigation report stating her conclusions and DeHorney was subsequently
discharged. 95 DeHorney brought a suit against Bank of America and the
auditor in California state court for wrongful discharge, interference with
contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress and racial
discrimination. 96 Because of the civil rights claim, the action was removed
to federal district court, where summary judgment was granted for the
defendants. 97 DeHorney appealed the dismissal of all of her causes of action
89. These employment benefits accrued over the employee's eighteen years of service. Id.
90. Id.
91. DeHorney v. Bank of America, 777 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1985). DeHorney had
reprocessed a $20 check that had already been processed and cancelled through her cash paid
checks. This error resulted in a $20 cash shortage. Until this incident, DeHorney had a good
work record. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 443. During the interrogation the auditor said "you people are always having
problems." DeHorney responded, "Are you calling me because I'm Black?" The auditor replied
"Don't give me that god dam[n] bullshit." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The auditor's investigation report stated that DeHorney "removed a $20 check from
a customer's check file and negotiated it through her cash pays." However, the actual Bank
of America form ordering DeHorney's termination simply stated "suspected negotiation of a
previously cash paid check $20." Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 443-44. DeHorney claimed racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Bank of America removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, based on
the federal question raised in DeHorney's racial discrimination claim. Summary judgment was
granted as to the intentional interference with contractual relations claim because the court held
that agents cannot conspire with their corporate principal while acting within the scope of their
employment. The racial discrimination claim failed because the court found no evidence to
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except the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
summary judgment was proper with respect to DeHorney's claims of inter-
ference with contractual relations and racial discrimination." In order to
address DeHorney's wrongful discharge claim, the court first concluded that
DeHorney was an at-will employee."10 This decision was based upon an
express employment agreement signed by DeHorney that provided she could
be terminated at will.' 0' Even without this express agreement, California
Labor Code Section 2922 has codified the at-will doctrine, and therefore,
DeHorney's at-will status was presumed. 10 2 The court, however, noted recent
California decisions that limited the application of Section 2922.103 The focus
of the DeHorney decision was to address the applicability of the three
available theories of recovery to an at-will employee in a wrongful discharge
action.
The court held that only DeHorney's claim of discharge based on racial
bias was sufficient to offend public policy. 104 However, because DeHorney
failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the court held
she could not recover under the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will rule.'0 5 The court next applied the "totality of the parties' relation-
ship" test established in Pugh, and held that DeHorney had not satisfied
establish the necessary nexus between the alleged racially biased statement and the decision to
terminate. The wrongful discharge claim was unsuccessful because the court held that Bank of
America had good cause to terminate DeHorney since she lost control of her cash paid items,
a terminable offense under bank employment policies. Id.
98. Id. at 444.
99. Id. at 445-46, 452-53. As to DeHorney's interference with contractual relations claim,
the court held that because the auditor was acting within the scope of her employment, her
actions in advising Bank of America are privileged and justified by the confidential employer-
employee relationship. Id. at 445-46. Moreover, because agents cannot conspire with their
corporate principal when they act in their official capacity, the auditor was held to be free of
liability. Id. The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of DeHorney's racial discrimination
claim because DeHorney failed to satisfy her evidentiary burden of establishing that race, more
likely than not, was a factor in her termination. Id. at 452-53. In fact, no evidence was offered
to establish that Bank of America had considered DeHorney's race in its termination decision.
Id.
100. Id. at 447.
101. Id. The written employment agreement provided that DeHorney could be released with
or without cause during a three month trial period. Additionally, after the trial period,
DeHorney's "permanent status" entitled her to "two weeks notice or one-half month's salary
in case of dismissal unless such dismissal results from dishonesty, disloyalty, insubordination,
or other good cause." Id.
102. Id. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
103. Id. The court set out the three distinct theories of recovery, with respect to at-will
employment contracts: 1) a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy; 2) a contract cause of action for the employer's breach of an implied in fact covenant
only to terminate for good cause; 3) a contract and tort cause of action for the employer's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. (citations omitted).
104. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 447.
105. Id. See supra note 99 regarding DeHorney's racial discrimination claim.
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the requirements necessary to establish an implied covenant to terminate
only for cause' 0 The distinguishing factor the court relied upon was that
DeHorney had not established a long term of employment. 10 7 The DeHorney
court held this relatively short term of employment to singularly override
the other factors in the Pugh test.'0
The DeHorney court next addressed the applicability of the good faith
and fair dealing exception.' °9 The court held that the good faith and fair
dealing exception is independent of any consideration of longevity required
by the implied contract exception because an employer must engage in good
faith and fair dealing with all of its employees."10 This is grounded in the
well-settled California law that implies a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract."' The court applied the definition of fair dealing
in the context of at-will employment from Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machines Corp., " 2 which stated that the duty of fair dealing requires
an employer to treat like cases alike." 3 Implied in this covenant is the
106. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448.
107. Id. The court noted that in Shapiro an employee terminated after three and one-half
years of service also failed to satisfy the Pugh "totality of the relationship" test. However,
this argument is unfounded because in Shapiro, the court held that the employee failed to rebut
his status as an at-will employee. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Thus, by
strictly following the two-tier Pugh test, the Shapiro court never considered the Pugh "totality
of the relationship" factors and made no finding based on the employee's length of service.
Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22.
Other California cases where an employee's length of service was held to be determinative
include Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (seventeen, eighteen
and twenty-five years of service); Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (thirty-two
years of service); Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d 433, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (eighteen years of service).
But cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985),
review granted, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, 712 P.2d 891 (1986) (employee's seven years of service fell
short of necessary longevity).
108. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448. After presenting the various Pugh factors, the court failed
to consider any but DeHorney's short term of employment. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 448 n.8. This conclusion rests on a novel interpretation of Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., that treats as independent the two elements necessary to invoke the good faith
and fair dealing exception. See infra notes 150-72 and accompanying text.
111. Id. (citing Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (1984)).
112. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984).
113. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448. A concurring opinion disagreed with this conclusion, finding
it inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gianaculus v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985). In Gianaculus, the court held that personnel policies and
procedures embodied in the employment manual did not become the measure of good faith
and fair dealing where the employment contract expressly permits termination at will. Id. at
1395. DeHorney's employment agreement also expressly provided that she could be terminated
at will. 777 F.2d at 447. The DeHorney majority did not follow Gianaculus because that
decision did not "consider the effect of Rulon-Miller.'" Id. at 451. The concurring judge,
however, was concerned that the majority's interpretation of Rulon-Miller would provide a
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employees' right to receive the benefit of rules and regulations adopted for
their protection. "1
4
After reviewing Bank of America's Code of Corporate Conduct, which
detailed the obligations of employer and employee, the court concluded that
there were several procedural deviations in DeHorney's dismissal. '"5 In fact,
very few of Bank of America's termination procedures were complied with
in DeHorney's termination. "' The court found that a question of fact existed
as to whether Bank of America breached its duty to treat like cases alike."17
Therefore, the court held that material issues of fact precluded summary
judgment on the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."'
III. ANALYSIS
Because California recognizes all three exceptions to the employment-at-
will rule, the United States Court of Appeals evaluated the applicability of
each to DeHorney's wrongful discharge claim." 9 This analytical approach
highlights how the underlying facts of an employee's termination dictate the
availability of a particular exception to the at-will rule. The decision also
illuminates the unsettled state of wrongful termination law in California by
focusing on the inconsistent holdings that have resulted from the California
courts' application of the three exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
A. Public Policy
DeHorney's claim that her discharge violated public policy was summarily
rejected by the court because she failed to establish a prima facie case of
contract or tort remedy for every termination deviating from the employer's established personnel
policies. Id. at 454 (Canby, J., concurring). He went on to question Rulon-Miller's interpretation
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and posited that Bank of America's Code of
Corporate Conduct was not adopted for DeHorney's protection. Id.
114. Id. at 448-49.
115. Id. at 449. The primary purpose of the Code of Corporate Conduct with respect to
employee terminations is to assure that "separations are carried out fairly and try to see that
employees leave with a feeling of having been justly treated." Specific examples of procedural
deviations surrounding DeHorney's termination include: 1) failure to afford DeHorney a
personal interview to discuss her termination; 2) no attempt to make DeHorney feel she was
justly treated; and 3) arguably the termination was not carried out fairly. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 450-51. Bank of America procedures provide that a teller is not to be discharged
for making a mistake. DeHorney contended she merely made a mistake when she placed the
filing check with the cash paid checks. Although bank policies prescribe termination when an
employee falsifies bank records or otherwise acts dishonestly, the form which ordered De-
Horney's termination identified the reason for her dismissal as "suspected negotiation of a
previously cash paid check $20." Arguably, DeHorney's dishonesty was not sufficiently estab-
lished at the time of her discharge. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 447.
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racial discrimination. 11 The test to establish a public policy exception is well
settled in California. An employer will be liable for wrongful discharge if
an employee can show that the employer's motivation for discharge con-
travenes some substantial public policy principle. 2 The court held that only
DeHorney's claim based on racial bias was sufficient to violate public
policy. 22 This comports with the California position that only terminations
in violation of a legislative act clearly violate public policy. 2 13 However,
because DeHorney failed to satisfy the burden of proof necessary to establish
a racial discrimination claim under federal law, there was no statutory
violation sufficient to invoke the public policy exception.' 2 4
The DeHorney decision typifies the limited reach of the public policy
exception in affording employees job security. The scope of the exception is
greatly restricted by the California common law requirement that a cause of
action be supported by statutory authority in order to satisfy the "substantial
public policy" standard.' 2' When an employee is terminated for refusing to
commit an illegal act'2 or the employer directly violates a statute by dis-
charging the employee, 27 a successful public policy cause of action can be
made. A public policy cause of action can also be inferred from statutory
authority, even where the discharge is not explicitly prohibited. 2 In such
cases, a violation of public policy is inferred because the employer's motive
for termination violates a statutory policy.129
While dicta in several California cases suggests that there can be a public
policy sufficient to support a cause of action for wrongful discharge absent
120. Id.
121. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 177, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (1980).
122. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 447.
123. The court found the necessary statutory support in DeHorney's racial discrimination
claim, which was grounded on 40 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (1986), a federal civil rights statute. To
date no California wrongful discharge claim based upon the public policy exception has
succeeded without statutory support. See Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the
Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 65, 76-83 (1982) (noting the
sources of public policy: either directly established based on a potential violation of a statute
or determined tangentially from the existence of statutes).
124. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 447. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
125. See Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477 n.5, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.5.
126. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee refused to participate in illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices);
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d
Dist. 1959) (employee refused to perjure himself before a legislative committee).
127. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132(a) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting retaliatory discharge
of employee filing worker's compensation claim).
128. See Miller & Estes, supra note 123, at 79-80 (section discussing circumstances where
public policy is inferred from a statute).
129. Id. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F. 2d 1367, 1374 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1984) (employee allegedly discharged for reporting shipment
of adulterated milk to health officials after supervisors ordered him to deliver it); Hentzel v.
Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (lst Dist. 1982) (employee
allegedly discharged for demanding a smoke free workplace).
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statutory authority, 130 California courts have been unwilling to make this
extension. In Shapiro, the court expressly held that courts have no power
to declare public policy without statutory support.' Thus, this judicial
exception provides little employee protection beyond that already embodied
in California statutory law.
This strict adherence to the requirement of statutory authority makes the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule the most predictable
and easy to apply. For these reasons, the DeHorney court had little difficulty
in upholding the dismissal of DeHorney's public policy claim. Further, the
California judiciary's willingness to defer to the legislature in defining what
constitutes a sufficient public policy comports with California Labor Code
Section 2922.132
B. Implied Contract
DeHorney's contractual claim of wrongful discharge in violation of an
implied covenant to terminate only for cause was rejected because DeHorney
had not established a long term of employment. 33 As set out in the Pugh
"totality of the relationship" test, the longevity of an employee's service is
one of the factors to be considered in finding an implied promise that an
employee can only be terminated for good cause. 134
Had the DeHorney court more closely followed the two-tiered Pugh test,
they would have eliminated the need to consider the factors that establish
an implied promise not to discharge except for good cause.'35 The first tier
requires the court to determine whether the employee can rebut the statutory
presumption of at-will status by showing an implied term of the contract to
the contrary. 13 6 Recent California decisions have held that written employ-
ment policies that provide procedural protections prior to discharge overcome
130. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (employers can
not contravene general statutes that articulate a fundamental public policy); Petermann, 174
Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (equating public policy with "sound morality").
131. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
132. In Santa Monica Hosp. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 698, 182 Cal. App. 3d
878, 218 Cal. Rptr. 543 (2d Dist. 1985), review granted, 222 Cal. Rptr. 224, 711 P.2d 520
(1986), the court noted the equitable appeal of the plaintiff's true posture, but held that
"plaintiff's complaint discloses she was not employed for a specified term . . . within the
meaning of Labor Code section 2922. Any further exceptions to or limits, if necessary on an
employer's right to hire and dismiss, should be made by the legislature." 218 Cal. Rptr. at
548.
133. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448.
134. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
135. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621 (recent application of the Pugh
two-tier test); see also Miller & Estes, supra note 123, at 100 (discussion of Pugh two-tier test).
136. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
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the presumption of at-will status. 37 There is no question that Bank of
America's Code of Corporate Conduct outlined detailed termination pro-
cedures to ensure just treatment of its employees. 38 The recent case of
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors39 presents a situation analogous to
DeHorney. In Shapiro, the employee failed to rebut the presumption of his
at-will status because he signed a stock option agreement that expressly
defined his employment relationship as at-will. '40 Similarly, DeHorney signed
a written employment agreement that expressly provided she could be ter-
minated at-will.' 4 ' Therefore, DeHorney was unable to rebut her presumptive
at-will status and it was unnecessary for the DeHorney court to consider the
implied promise factors set out in the second tier of the Pugh test.
The implied contract exception to the employment-at-will rule in California
is considerably different than the exception traditionally recognized by other
state courts. In California, once an employee successfully rebuts the at-will
presumption, they must then produce evidence, considered in light of the
factors set out in Pugh, that would establish an implied promise that the
employee would be terminated only for cause. 42 By rejecting DeHorney's
implied contract claim solely because she failed to establish a long term of
employment, 43 the court disregarded the "totality of the employment rela-
tionship" test required by Pugh. While longevity of service is indeed a
significant factor, other California decisions have not found it to be singularly
determinative.'"
By recognizing an implied contract exception to the employment-at-will
rule, California relies on the same contemporary contract law that forms the
137. See Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosps. of Sacramento, 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753-
56, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611-13 (3d Dist. 1984) (employee terminated in violation of hospital
by-laws); Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 902-05,
185 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621-22 (4th Dist. 1982) (employment handbook held to constitute terms of
employment).
138. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 449.
139. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (2d Dist. 1984).
140. Id. at 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
141. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 447.
142. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621; Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at
327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
143. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448.
144. Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985) (summary judgment inappropriate where employee
had been employed for fifteen years, had been one of the top salesmen for the last eight years,
received several commendations and no formal criticism of work during course of employment);
Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (implied contract claim
denied where employee had less than two years of service and a less than satisfactory work
record); Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9,
12 (2d Dist. 1984) (implied contract claim denied where employee had less than two years of
service and a less than adequate performance record).
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basis of the exception in other jurisdictions . 45 Representative of this approach
is the disregard of the previous requirements of mutuality of obligation and
separate independent consideration. 46 The key requirement of a binding
contract under modern contractual theory is that there be adequacy of
consideration.' 47 Thus, it is ironic that while basing its implied contract
exception to the employment-at-will rule on modern contract theory, Cali-
fornia continues to adhere to the Pugh common law "factor" test to
determine the exception's availability.
The formalistic contractual analysis applied by other jurisdictions, as
outlined in Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,148 meets the objectives set
out in Pugh that employment contracts should be construed to give effect
to the intention of the parties. 49 The fact that DeHorney had been employed
only nine months does not, by itself, compel the conclusion that an implied
promise of termination only for cause did not exist. In fact, the application
of a more formalistic contractual analysis, as set out in Woolley, might lead
to the conclusion that Bank of America's policies, taken in their entirety,
constituted a promise that DeHorney would not be terminated arbitrarily,
regardless of the length of her service.
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
DeHorney's claim that her discharge was in violation of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was upheld because the court
determined that questions of fact existed as to whether Bank of America
breached its duty to apply its termination rules and procedures 5 ' and treated
DeHorney's investigation and termination in the manner required by Bank
of America's Code of Corporate Conduct for similar teller discrepancies.' 5'
The DeHorney court relied on a definition from Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machines, Inc., 15 2 stating that the duty of fair dealing requires that
like cases be treated alike, which includes the right of employees to receive
the benefit of rules and regtlations adopted for their protection.'53
145. See Miller & Estes, supra note 123, at 98 (noting that the Pugh decision followed
contemporary contract law by disposing of the requirements of mutuality or independent
consideration).
146. The court viewed the requirement of these rules as one of construction and not substance.
Id.
147. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 17, at 1819 (doctrine of
consideration does not require perfectly matching promises on each side of a bargain).
148. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985). See also supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text
(discussion of implied contract exception in other jurisdictions).
149. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
150. DeHorney, 777 F. 2d at 451.
151. Id. at 450.
152. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984).
153. DeHorney, 777 F.2d at 448. But see supra note 113.
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Curiously, the definition of good faith and fair dealing from Rulon-Miller
fails to cite any authority as precedent. '1 4 More significant is the complete
absence in the Rulon-Miller analysis of Cleary, the seminal and still active
California employment-at-will good faith and fair dealing case.' Although
Cleary and Rulon-Miller are from different California appellate districts, the
Cleary approach is of higher precedential value because its rationale is
supported by California Supreme Court dicta. 5 6
In Cleary, the court held that the longevity of the employee's service,
together with the expressed policy of the employer, operated as a form of
estoppel, precluding discharge without good cause.'57 These two factors were
held to be of paramount importance in determining whether an employee
asserted a viable good faith and fair dealing cause of action. 5 8 In light of
recent cases following Cleary, it is clear that DeHorney's good faith and
fair dealing cause of action would fail because of the brevity of her em-
ployment.
However, the DeHorney court interpreted Cleary as holding that the
express policy of the employer is sufficient to support a good faith and fair
dealing cause of action. 5 9 In reaching this conclusion, the DeHorney court
relied upon language in Cleary that stated that the existence of employment
policies compels the conclusion that the employer has recognized its duty to
engage in good faith and fair dealing with respect to all its employees.' 6
The DeHorney court further reasoned that its holding is consistent with
general contract law in California.' 6' The court also cited Woolley for its
holding that termination procedures contained in employment policy manuals
are contractually enforceable. 62
154. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
155. For recent decisions following the Cleary standard for good faith and fair dealing, see
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (implied covenant of
good faith applied where employee alleges long service and existence of personnel policies
showing implied promise not to act arbitrarily); Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600 F. Supp.
765, 768-69 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (claim rejected because of short service and failure to bring
forward policies giving employee reasonable belief that he would not be discharged except for
good cause); Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445-46, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 9, 12 (2d Dist. 1984) (action based on naked covenant of good faith and fair dealing
insufficient; must show combination of elements-longevity and company policies); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (2d Dist.
1984) (employee failed to allege facts under either of two factors specified in Cleary).
156. The California Supreme Court recognized the good faith and fair dealing exception to
the at-will rule in other jurisdictions and its applicability to California insurance cases. Tameny,
27 Cal. 3d at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
157. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
158. Id.
159. The DeHorney court noted that the good faith and fair dealing theory of recovery is
"independent of any consideration of longevity of service." 777 F.2d at 448, 448 n.8.
160. Id.
161. After reviewing other decisions, the court stated that its holding "is not in any substantial
way a variation from general contract law in California." Id. at 448-49.
162. Id. at 449 n.9.
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The primary weakness of the DeHorney decision is that it relies solely on
contractual principles to arrive at its good faith and fair dealing holding.
This is strikingly inconsistent because the court earlier concluded that
DeHorney failed to support her implied contractual claim to terminate only
for cause. 63 Under both exceptions DeHorney relied on Bank of America's
Code of Corporate Conduct to support her cause of action. 64 It is peculiar
that although DeHorney was unable to support a contractual claim, the same
factors were sufficient to establish a combined tort and contract claim.
Moreover, other jurisdictions limit the consideration of implied promises of
job security contained in employment policies to a contractual analysis.' 65
Support for this view is also found in California decisions. The Pugh court
was presented with facts more deserving of the good faith and fair dealing
exception than the Cleary court, but expressly chose a contractual analysis
as a superior theory of recovery.'66
Because a tort cause of action arises from a breach of a duty,' 67 this duty
arguably accrues with an employee's continued service. This conclusion finds
support in Cleary, which held that an employer's duty not to terminate an
employee without legal cause accrued during the employee's eighteen years
of service. 68 Cleary also held that the duty arising from the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is "unconditional and independent in nature.' ' 69
Under a modern contractual analysis, express employer policies become part
of the bargained for terms of employment. 70 Therefore, longevity of service
provides the independent element necessary to satisfy a good faith and fair
dealing claim. Using this analysis, DeHorney would fail to establish a good
faith and fair dealing cause of action because her claim was not independent
of her employment contract. Based on the above, the DeHorney court
incorrectly interpreted the Cleary holding. Longevity of service combined
with the existence of express policies conferring just treatment are required
to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 17'
163. Id. at 448.
164. Id. at 448-49. The concurring judge questioned whether the Code of Corporate Conduct
was adopted for DeHorney's protection. Id. at 454 (Canby, J., concurring). He found it
inconsistent that a vague directive providing for just treatment was sufficient to establish a
duty of fair dealing, when that directive was contained in an employment agreement expressly
terming the employment relationship as at-will. Id. See supra note 113.
165. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
88 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d (Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
166. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
167. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 4 (1984).
168. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
169. Id. at 463, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (emphasis in original).
170. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
171. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis added). In Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), review granted, 222
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By de-emphasizing the previous requirement of longevity of service, the
DeHorney decision greatly expands the availability of the good faith and
fair dealing exception to California at-will employees. Under DeHorney, a
wrongfully terminated employee need only assert the existence of personnel
policies conferring just treatment to invoke the good faith and fair dealing
exception. 7 2 Because most larger employers have some form of express
employment policies, the decision effectively imposes a "good cause" stand-
ard for dismissal on all employers in California.
IV. IMPACT
Without question, employees in jurisdictions recognizing the good faith
and fair dealing exception to the employment-at-will rule are afforded the
greatest protection from arbitrary discharge. 17 The DeHorney decision sig-
nificantly expands a California employer's potential for wrongful termination
liability by relaxing the elements previously required for a valid good faith
and fair dealing cause of action. 74 This wholesale relaxation avails the good
faith and fair dealing standard to virtually all California employees. Thus,
the DeHorney common law exception has effectively overruled the employ-
ment-at-will rule in California and in its place imposed a "good cause"
standard.
The common law provision of increased job security imposes substantial
costs on California employers. For example, a "good cause" standard of
termination will hinder the growth of aggressive businesses by requiring them
to retain "average" employees. This judicially imposed "tenure" system is
also likely to carry serious economic costs in terms of productivity and
efficiency. By disregarding the agreement signed by DeHorney that provided
she could be terminated at will, the court implied that employees cannot
voluntarily waive their rights to the DeHorney "good cause" standard. 75
Additionally, the overly broad DeHorney standard will produce societal costs
by burdening the courts with reviewing the fairness of virtually every ter-
mination decision.
As is common with the development of a new theory of recovery, broad-
ened liability for wrongful discharge is likely to cause many employers to
Cal. Rptr. 740, 712 P.2d 891 (1986), the court held that to prove a violation of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must show "longevity of service, and breach of an
express employer policy regarding the adjudication of employee disputes." 219 Cal. Rptr. at
871 (emphasis added). The Foley court expressly disagreed with a California decision holding
that "the theory of recovery articulated in Cleary is not dependent on the particular factors
identified in that case." Id. (quoting Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262,
215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1985)).
172. 777 F.2d at 448-49.
173. See Lopatka, supra note 25, at 5 (the California good faith and fair dealing exception
is very close to a common law duty to discharge only for just cause).
174. 777 F.2d at 448-49.
175. Id. at 447.
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discontinue voluntary extensions of job security as a prophylactic measure.
Many California businesses responded to the rapid development of the
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule prior to DeHorney. Examples of
such actions by employers include: 1) requiring employees to sign a statement
which defines their status as at-will; 2) hiring attorneys to review policy
manuals to remove any assertions of job security; 3) hiring attorneys to
consult upon and even effectuate termination decisions; and 4) purchasing
insurance policies that protect an employer in the event of a finding of
wrongful discharge liability. 7 6
The DeHorney'decision does not coexist comfortably with California Labor
Code Section 2922, because they both provide opposite presumptive protec-
tions. 17 7 The development of the common law good faith and fair dealing
exception directly contradicts the judiciary's deference to the legislature
regarding the public policy exception. Given the sweeping implications to
both society and private enterprise by the expansion of the good faith and
fair dealing exception, the DeHorney decision is clearly imprudent and any
changes in the employment-at-will presumptions are arguably better left to
the legislature. 171
CONCLUSION
The DeHorney decision places California in the untenable position of
having a common law theory of recovery for wrongful termination that is
in direct conflict with a statutory presumption of employment-at-will. This
outcome is representative of the confusion and contradictions that surround
the application of California's exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
When applying the public policy exception, California courts defer to a
legislative definition of public policy. In stark contrast is the development
of the good faith and fair dealing exception, which directly conflicts with
statutory authority. Finally, the development of the implied contractual
exception, while based upon modern contractual theories, adheres to an
approach that allows a single common law factor to be determinative.
The most likely reason for this erratic and inconsistent development of
wrongful discharge law is a desire to provide a remedy for employees whose
176. R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO, MANAGERS GUIDE FOR LAWFUL TERMINATIONS (1983) (book
designed to help employers minimize economic risk associated with terminating employees); L.
LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, supra note 3, § 9 (chapter detailing various employer defenses);
Lopatka, supra note 25, at 26-32 (setting out preventive measures to minimize the risks of
wrongful discharge liability).
177. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 132. See also DeFranco, Modification of the Employee A t Will Doctrine-
Balancing Judicial Development of the Common Law with the Legislative Prerogative to Declare
Public Policy, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 65 (1985) (courts do not have the investigatory machinery
to analyze complex socio-economic data, nor are they empowered with the right to formulate
public policy; therefore the judiciary should only provide a remedy that can be limited to those
employees who need protection).
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termination violates a judicial standard of fairness. The rationale supporting
the DeHorney decision is suspect, and it is clear that the court stretched
precedent in order to reach their desired result. While providing DeHorney
with relief, the court failed to consider the significant societal and economic
costs that are likely to result from expanding the good faith and fair dealing
exception to the employment-at-will rule. Arguably, courts do not possess
the investigatory resources required to evaluate the impact of such a pervasive
decision.
R. Cabell Morris, Jr.
